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This work presents a thorough hazards identification methodology for liquid hydrocarbon fuel storage 
tanks, by applying a checklist technique on the accident causes and the relevant protection measures, 
in the framework of implementing the SEVESO Directive series. A forum discussion with Greek 
industrial safety experts has also been organized by the authors in order to improve and correct any 
lack of the method. Results are presented and discussed, and it is concluded that the present hazard 
assessment method helps to identify the major contributors to risk, to improve safety measures and to 
assist the analysis in these aspects.  
1. Introduction 
Modern petrochemical complexes, and especially refineries, comprise large storage facilities, which 
contain, among others, significant amounts of flammable hydrocarbon fuels and chemicals in large 
storage tanks. Despite the fact that the occurrence of a tank fire accident is a relatively rare 
phenomenon, its results may lead to unexpected consequences for the installation and also cause 
potential environmental and health damage that is difficult to assess apriori. 
Significant tank fire accidents have happened recently, such as the December 11th, 2005 Buncefield 
Oil Storage Depots (BOSD) disaster (Buncefield Major Investigation Board, 2008; Herbert, 2010) and 
the massive tank fire of October 23rd, 2009 at the Caribbean Petroleum Refining. These accidents 
demonstrate not only the large scale of destruction in the surroundings, together with the implication of 
potential environmental issues, but also the necessity to prevent these accidents by any means. 
Studies have been undertaken through literature review with the aim to perform statistical analyses of 
accident occurrence in storage tanks. The conclusions of such studies are that fire outbursting is the 
most frequent type of accident in this type of installations, caused primarily by lightning and, in the 
second place, by maintenance errors. 
Intensive research has also been undertaken by many groups of scientists and engineers towards the 
investigation and explanation of the physical characteristics of the phenomena involved in large 
hydrocarbon tank fires as by Argyropoulos et al. (2010), Markatos et al. (2009), Vautard et al. (2007), 
McGrattan et al. (1996) and Ghoniem et al. (1993). These physical characteristics are focused on the 
estimation of plume dispersion and height elevation, the ground-level concentration of the toxic 
pollutants, such as smoke, sulphur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), polyaromatic hydrocarbons 
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(PAHs), and volatile compounds (VOCs), together with the characterization of risks zones by 
comparing the ground-level concentrations with existing safety thresholds.  
The present work deals with a thorough hazards identification methodology for liquid hydrocarbon fuel 
storage tanks, by applying a checklist technique on the accident causes and the relevant protection 
measures, in the framework of implementing the SEVESO Directive series (European Council, 1982, 
1997). A forum discussion with Greek industrial safety experts has also been organized by the authors 
in order to improve and correct any lack of the method. 
2. Accidents in storage tanks 
Large liquid storage tanks are used in the petroleum and chemical industries for the storing of both raw 
material and intermediate or finished products in confined areas that are normally separated from the 
rest of the installation. The types of tanks for storing combustible or flammable liquid hydrocarbon fuel 
are classified in three main types by the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE, 2008), as follows: 
a) Fixed or cone roof tanks, made of a vertical cylinder side and a fixed cone-shaped roof welded to 
each other, usually containing “black” heavy products, such as fuel-oils, asphalt (bitumen) and 
vacuum or atmospheric residue.  
b) Open top floating roof tanks, made of a vertical, cylindrical above ground shell similar to the 
conical roof tank, but with a pontoon type roof, characterized by the ability to rise and fall on the 
stored-fuel surface, in order to prevent the large volumes emittance of fuel-vapours 
c) Internal floating roof storage tanks, a combination of the above consisting of a conical roof with the 
addition of the internal floating roof or pan that floats directly on the fuel surface, so as to decrease 
the potential of ignition and to prevent the initiation of tank fires. 
The second and third categories of tanks are used for volatile liquid hydrocarbons such as crude oil 
and “white” light products (jet, diesel and gasoline). 
Potential fire scenarios that can be developed in a tank accident are presented in (LASTFIRE, 2001) as 
follows: rim seal fire; spill on roof fire; full surface fire; bund or dyke fire; pontoon explosion; and 
Boilover. 
3. Hazards identification methodology for liquid hydrocarbon fuel storage tanks 
3.1 General steps 
A liquid hydrocarbon fuel storage tank farm is a particular type of a chemical installation, in which the 
hazard stems mainly from the big potential for fire. A hazards analysis should comprise all the general 
items, such as described by Papazoglou et al. (1992): 
 Description of the local area, including a general map. 
 Sufficient knowledge of the hydrogeological, hydrographical and meteorological data of the area 
together with any protected environmental zones. 
 Sufficient meteorological data with heavy snow and heavy rain frequencies. 
 List of the hazardous installations in the surroundings. 
 Ground plan of the plant and/or tank farm together with process flow diagrams. 
 Description of production processes for every location of the plant. 
 Characteristics of chemical substances according to “SEVESO II”, together with declaration of the 
stored hazardous substances accompanied by Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS).  
3.2 Proposed methodology for tank inspection 
Before going into a full-blown quantitative analysis, this work proposes a screening methodology that 
can, quite easily, lead to the identification of the areas where a fire can start as a result of a hazardous 
substance release. The methodology is based on the philosophy of the checklist, namely a catalogue 
of causes that could lead to the failure of the tank, together with a list of preventive and /or protection 
measures that can avert the occurrence of an accident in a storage tank. These two lists derive from 
past experience of tank operation and maintenance, and are to be considered as prerequisite 
conditions to avoid problems in safety. If an installation satisfies these criteria, then the accident 
potential is very low without banning risk totally. 
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 3.2.1. Failure causes of tank accidents 
The most common initiating events or failure causes for fixed/cone and floating roof tanks are grouped 
in the general headings presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Immediate causes of accidents 
1. Operational errors 4. Static electricity 7. Piping rupture/ leak 
Tank overfilling Rubber seal cutting Valve leaking 
Drain valves left open 
accidentally 
Poor grounding Flammable liquid leak from a gasket 
Vent closed during 
loading/unloading 
Fluid transfer Piping failure 
Oil leaks due to operators 
errors 
Improper sampling 
procedures 
Pump leak 
High inlet temperature   Cut accidentally  
Drainage ducts to retention 
basin obstructed 
 Failure owing to liquid expansion 
   
2. Equipment/instrument 
failure 
5. Maintenance errors 8. Miscellaneous 
Floating roof sunk Welding/ cutting Earthquake 
Level indicator Non explosion-proof motor 
and tools used 
Extreme weather  
Discharge valve rupture Circuit shortcut Vehicle impact on piping 
Rusted vent valve does not 
open 
Transformer spark Open flames/ Smoking flame 
 Poor grounding of soldering 
equipment 
Escalation from another unit (domino) 
 Poor maintenance of 
equipment both normal and 
blast-proof 
Accident caused by energy/fuel 
transportation lines 
  Arson (intentional damage) 
   
3. Lightning 6. Tank crack/ rupture 9. Safety supporting systems 
Poor grounding Poor soldering Electric power loss 
Rim seal leaks Shell distortion/ buckling Insufficient tank cooling 
Flammable liquid leak from 
seal rim 
Corrosion Firefighting water loss 
Direct hit  Firefighting water in piping freezing 
 
3.2.2. Preventive and protection measures 
For all the mentioned causes in Table 1 there are certain protective measures aimed at limiting or 
preventing their occurrence and they are presented in Table 2. 
3.3 Checklist for tank safety assessment 
The analysis led the study team to the development of a prototype check list that can detect all of the 
above causes and protection measures and be a valuable tool in the hands of all safety practitioners, 
both analysts and installation owners. This list has the form of Tables 1 & 2 having additional space for 
‘Evaluation’ and ‘Comments’ regarding the awareness of failure causes and the implementation of 
protection measures by tank farm owners. These remarks are filled out by the person who performs the 
tank inspection. More specifically, in column “Evaluation” the inspector must complete each cell of the 
table with the appropriate letter (A, B, C or X), each letter referring to a specific situation observed by 
the inspector always according to the proposed methodology and findings. The explanation of each 
letter is as follows: A: Full description (the safety study describes the specific failure cause or protective 
measure with full details), B: Insufficient description (the safety study does not describe the specific 
failure cause or protective measure with the appropriate detail), C: Inefficient (the safety study does not 
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include or there is inefficient description of the specific failure cause or protective measure), and X: 
Inapplicable (the specific failure cause or protective measure is inapplicable to this installation). The 
“Comments” column contains any comment of the inspector that is important to be referred for the 
specific failure cause or protective measure. 
Table 2: Protective measures 
1. Design 3. Equipment 5. Miscellaneous 
Following engineering 
standards and regulations 
Following engineering 
standards 
Safe guarding 
Modification of tank top 
design to prevent overfilling  
Handling static electricity 
during tank loading 
Electrical supply of tanks added to 
critical utilities 
Site inspection Lightning protection system No smoking/good housekeeping 
Safe distance High-integrity automatic 
operating overfilling 
prevention system 
Protection against extreme weather 
phenomena 
Dikes, bunds Arrangements to ensure that 
the receiving agent has 
ultimate control of tank filling. 
Protection from vehicle bumping 
Defining tank capacity Remotely operated  and fire-
safe shut-off valves 
Protection of piping from mechanical 
stress 
 Protection against fluid 
expansion in piping 
Protection from DOMINO effects 
 Temperature monitoring Protection from areal electric power 
lines 
  Proper labelling and traffic signing 
2. Maintenance 4. Safety supporting 
systems 
Appropriate management  of oily 
waste 
Routine inspection Fire detection and alarm 
system 
Appropriate management  of 
firefighting water 
Periodic proof testing of 
overfill prevention system/  
Firefighting network Appropriate management  of rain 
water 
Corrosion resistance Foam  supply and production 
system  
Good house keeping (5S - Sort, 
Straighten, Shine, Standardize, 
Sustain) 
Preventive checking of 
venting equipment 
Tank cooling system   
Use proper equipment Spare firefighting water tank/ 
diesel driven pump  
 
Use explosion proof tools Anti-Frost protection   
Maintenance of both 
normal and blast proof 
equipment 
Connection of   gas detection 
with the overfilling prevention 
system.  
 
Hot work permit CCTV equipment  
Checking of successful 
work completion 
Emergency Response Plan  
 
4. Discussion of methodology 
In order to verify the soundness of the methodology, the development team has presented it to a  
group of Greek safety experts coming from big refineries and from commercial tank farm sites  and has 
discussed with them the methodology highlights so as to elicit their opinion considered of high 
importance. Group discussions have been organised with the operation and safety experts at each site 
(2 to 3 persons), where the study team presented in a structured manner the items of both Tables 1 
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and 2 trying to cause the reaction of the experts and register their opinion/suggestions on them. Each 
group discussion lasted for one and a half to two hours, while the experts had the possibility to send 
back their remarks in writing. The discussion results together with the elaboration of the experts’ written 
assessment led to the ordering of specified failure causes and proposed measures, on the basis of 
their significance in the current practice in the visited installations. As most of these companies are 
directly affiliated to multinational ones (Shell, Esso) or operate under the international state of the art, 
the study team reckons that the results of this discussion are applicable outside Greece as well. It has 
been verified that some installation owners are very much aligned, in most safety issues, with the after 
Buncefield international practice. Additionally, the discussion with the experts has approved in general 
the findings of the literature and gave rise to some additional remarks-suggestions. 
5. Conclusions 
In the present paper, an exhaustive hazards identification and good practice methodology for liquid 
hydrocarbon fuel storage tanks have been presented, aimed at being applied in the Risk Assessment 
Analysis of any liquid hydrocarbon tank farm; particularly in the ones liable to the European Legislation 
of the series of “SEVESO” Directives.  The methodology gives valuable insight of potential risks to the 
installations owners and can result in the ordering of tank accident sequences according to their risk 
severity. 
The most common initiating events leading to an accident in a liquid hydrocarbon fuel storage tank 
together with the preventive and protection measures to be taken have been listed. The innovative part 
of the present study is the presentation of the check list aimed at helping both safety engineers and 
safety reviewers to easily identify the major contributors to risk and detail the analysis in those aspects. 
Several group discussions has been organised by the authors of the proposed methodology with 
experienced safety engineers from the Greek petrochemical industries, with the aim to improve and 
correct any lacks in the methodology. This initiative has helped a lot, as the teams of experts 
interviewed have significant knowledge and expertise in the operation of liquid hydrocarbon fuel 
storage tanks and know exactly the critical points behind the safe operation of these installations.  
Experts believe that this methodology can greatly help in quick the assessment of the safe operation of 
liquid hydrocarbon fuel storage tanks. The discussion has additionally shown that issues that do not 
rank high in experts’ opinion must all the same be highlighted and adequately ordered within the 
framework of the SEVESO II type of safety analyses. In particular, the Vapour cloud explosion scenario 
should be thoroughly analysed, together with the proposal of additional preventive and /or protective 
measures, so as to minimize its probability to occur, given that the consequences are per definition 
disastrous. 
Moreover, in commercial tank farms, where the safety measures and the expertise are not comparable 
to the ones of big refineries, additional safety management measures should be taken, such as the in 
situ observing of tank filling either by an operator or by a CCTV system. 
The authors hope that the proposed methodology will be beneficial for safety engineers, safety report 
evaluators, safety inspectors and process companies, which are involved in the preparation and 
evaluation of safety studies for liquid hydrocarbon fuel storage tanks.  
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